Speaker: Fabrizio Tassinari, Visiting Fellow, CEPS
 
Discussant: Janos Herman, Principal Advisor, DG RELEX, European Commission
 
Chair: Gergana Noutcheva, Research Fellow, CEPS
 
Date: 17 July 2006
 
Following the welcoming and introductory words of the chairwoman Gergana Noutcheva, CEPS Research Fellow, Prof. Tassinari took the floor and provided the audience with a comprehensive summary of his study. He began by explaining the rationale behind his support for more EU involvement in the region, stating first of all that the EU has obviously become a Black Sea power due to its enlargement process. Secondly, he drew attention to the fact that EU initiatives in the region are mainly bilateral, although bilateral instruments are only effective to a certain extent for tackling such issues like migration, etc. Thirdly, he mentioned that the rise of Western-minded states combined with Russia’s rather assertive posture towards them makes EU involvement and search for regionalism a necessity. Lastly, he argued that very existence of home-grown initiatives, such as BSEC, GUAM or Black Sea Forum, has prepared the ground for further regional integration.
 
The second part of the presentation contained an analysis of the three existing regional frameworks promoted by the EU. The drawbacks and the virtues of each of regional schemes were given:

1. Euro-Mediterranean Strategic Partnership

Assets:

• Dialogue and confidence-building for the whole region
• Holistic approach to regional security interdependence

Liabilities:

• Ineffective political and security dialogue (due to the exclusion of MEPP from the process)
• Heterogeneous security concerns

2. Stability Pact

Assets:

• Coordination among different donors and international actors
• Financing and political signal of importance attached to Balkans by EU

Liabilities:

• ‘Quick states’ were not obliged to benefit from it (such as Slovenia and Croatia)
• Imposed from above, scepticism from within. Whole managerial and conceptual work about how the region should look like has been done by EU and international actors.

3. Northern Dimension

Assets:

• Bottom-up nature; the initiative came from within instead of outside-in
• Inclusion of and equality with Russia

Liabilities:

• Lost strategic purpose (especially after the enlargement)
• Little ‘added value’

Taking into consideration the shortcomings and the successes of the previous schemes, Prof. Tassinari proposed a model for an EU initiative for the Black Sea region composed of three pillars: prioritisation, variable geometries and synergy.
 
Prioritisation proved to be vital since one of the failures of BSEC is considered to be its broad scope and the large number of its priorities. Therefore the model suggested a focus on five priority areas deemed to be crucial in a regional approach:
 
1. Environment: Black Sea cooperation has achieved a high level of institutionalisation on this issue e.g. the DABLAS Task Force and the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan.
 
2.Energy: This sector involves major geostrategic implications for Europe. Although initiatives such as the Commission’s Green Paper or Baku Process are welcomed, the diversification of gas and oil supplies remains to be of the utmost importance.
 
3. Transport: The Commission is acknowledged to be very active in this sector owing to the initiatives like TRACECA, the Baku Process and the High Level Group of Experts. Drawing on these existing processes, infrastructure, interoperability and intermodality have been identified as the regional priorities in this field.
 
4. Internal security: Among a wide range of potential issues under the scope of internal security, the focus will be on crime prevention. The cooperation will concentrate on the exchange of information, strategic assessments and the establishment of region-wide standards for sharing data.
 
5. Democratic institutions: Since upholding the rule of law and promoting human rights are always high on the EU agenda, they also form a part of this cooperation. An independent democracy review process to evaluate the performance of Black Sea countries is foreseen under this rubric.
 
The idea of variable geometry is to have different geographical maps for each priority but nonetheless to keep a core group of states. Accordingly, the framework – or the synergy as it is called in the study – consists of five partnerships, each focusing on one priority area. The partnerships are to be composed of senior officials representing actors already operating in the region. Moreover, each partnership is planned to have a driving actor in charge of coordination. However, these partnerships are loosely tied to each other by an overarching, non-institutionalised mechanism. Within this context, the Black Sea Forum, an initiative launched by Romania last month, seems an appropriate mechanism with its non-institutionalised and high-level political character.
 
Financially, to make sure that they do not run independently, support funds – which in the case of EU would be granted from the ENPI budget-, will be provided.
The study concludes that six essential qualities should characterise any further initiative towards the Black Sea region:
 
1. Pragmatism – not a long list of priorities
2. Coordination – streamlining existing cooperation
3. Ownership – credible initiatives from the part of EU
4. Flexibility – varying geographical scope
5. Consistency – supporting the broader dynamics such as ENP
6. Visibility – signalling the importance attached to the region by EU.
 
The discussant, Janos Herman, Principal Adviser for the ENP in European Commission, expressed his appreciation of the work carried out by Fabrizio Tassinari and CEPS. He underlined the difficulty that they are facing to develop a common regional approach towards the Black Sea owing to particularities of the region. He drew attention to the changing borders of the region depending on the topic treated. Referring to the three different policies pursued in the region by the Commission, namely enlargement policy, ENP and the strategic partnership with Russia, he nevertheless stated that they have a common essence and that they all support a kind of a ‘transition’. While acknowledging the validity of Tassinari’s remark on EU policies being mainly bilateral in the region, he emphasised the significance of some sector-specific regional initiatives. He also argued that the question of whether the EU should have a regional approach towards the Black Sea needs to receive more reflection, especially regarding the feasibility and the added-value of such an approach. Lastly, he mentioned some measures undertaken by the Commission to build up regional cooperation from inside, such as the support given to sub-regional organisations and Black Sea cross-border cooperation which involves sub-state actors.